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IN THE SUPREME COURT

OF THE STATE OF UTAH

~l!E

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Respondent.

vs.
I

J\GIL S. REDMOND,

Case No.
19,401

Defendant-Appellant.

APPELLANT'S BRIEF

STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE
Criminal prosecution for allegedly uttering a factitious
rheck.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
Defendant was sentenced to a term in the State Prison
.ifter guilty verdict.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Defendant seeks a new trial and an order compelling

:he prosecution to make available to him the other checks
"f the same series as the check charged in the information
·.\hich have been gathered up by the police and are being

't;ppressed by the prosecution and withheld from defendant.

2
STATEMENT OF FACTS
During April, 1964, Tom Stoker, a witness for the
prosecution, opened a bank account (R. 185) under the
name of Prudential Federal Adjusters (R 186) in a Salt
Lake City Bank (Ex. 2 & 3) by representing himself as
"C. Coon" (Ex 1), had checks imprinted with that name
(Rl88), typed a large number of checks on that account
each for approximately the same amount, each naming
C. J. McCall as payee and each of which he signed Carl
J. Coon except the check herein charged which he signea
Cal J. Coon. (R 267-268). Approximately 50 checks were
negotiated over a week-end from that series. (R 268;
One such check was cashed at Makoff's. Defendant is
charg~d herein with uttering that check.
The police and prosecution gathered up and withheld
from defendant and his counsel all of the bank records
pertaining to the bank account opened by Stoker and
upon which said checks were drawn and all of the checks
drawn on that account which were a part of the series
mentioned above. (R 598). Without access to those rec·
ords and checks defendant has been unable to learn the
names of the persons who accepted checks of that series
or to locate and identify persons who cashed those checks
for use as witnesses to establish that it was a third person.
and not the defendant, who cashed those checks and the
check with which he is charged herein. (R 598)
Prior to preliminary hearing of this matter Judge Beck
ordered the County Attorney to furnish said checks and
other requested information pursuant to a demand for a
bill of particulars. The checks and records were not fur·
nished and defendant's motion to dismiss the complaint

3
for failure to furnish that information was heard before
Judge Neeley who denied the motion. Judge Hanson of
the District Court denied a petition for an extraordinary
wnt to compel furnishing of said checks and his decision
was affirmed by this Court on appeal. Redmond v. City
Court, 17 U2d 95, 404 P2d 964. In that decision the Court
underscored the fact that said proceeding was taken in
connection with a preliminary hearing and noted that it
was on a petition for an extraordinary writ, apparently
to indicate that we were not to be precluded from raising
those questions in this appeal.

Defendant asked for substantially the same information in a request for a bill of particulars in the District
Court (R596-603). Extensive arguments were heard by
the Court (R 597-602; R 606-618) prior to trial concerning defendant's request for access to those checks, etc.,
however Judge Anderson ruled that evidence concerning
checks other than the one charged in the information was
not material to the issues in this case (R 615) after hearing argument from the prosecution to the effect that evidence concerning said other checks would be wholly inadmissable at the trial and immaterial to the issues (R
620-621) and denied defendant's motion for access to
those checks. Defendant reasserted and reargued his motion for access to the other checks that were a part of
said series of checks at the commencement of the trial
(R 597-603; R 625), during the course of the trial (R 35659) and also his motions for a continuance (R 358) and
for a mistrial (R 358), all of which were denied by the
Court.

At the time defendant was arrained the information
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charged him with uttering a check for the payment 0,,
money of C. J. McCall ( R 1), however the informatior.
was amended when a co-defendant was arrained to
charge uttering a check for the payment of money of Cari
J. Coon (R 1; R 605. Defendant has never been given a
preliminary hearing on a charge pertaining to uttering ;i
check for payment of money of Carl J. Coon.
At the time of arrainment defendant requested that the
witnesses called at the trial be limited to those listed or.
the information or that defendant be furnished with the
names of additional witnesses which the prosecution ir.tended to call at the time of trial. (R 607). The District
Attorney agreed to furnish the names of additional v.itnesses to be called at the trial as soon as they becamf:
known to him (R 607), however no additional names
were endorsed on the information or furnished to the
defendant. Defendant objected to calling of witnesses for
the prosecution whose names had not been supplied (R
355-358), moved for a continuance or mistrial (R 3581.
however his motions were denied and approximately 14
additional prosecution witnesses who were not named in
the information and who had not testified at the prelim·
inary hearing were permitted to testify for the State.
Many of these witnesses were persons who had cashed
other check which were a part of the series sought by
defendant, and were persons whose names were withhelc
from defendant by suppression of the other checks from
defendant by the prosecution. Defendant had no oppor·
tunity to prepare to meet the testimony of these addi·
tional witnesses, much of which testimony was vague
and indefinite.
The Court permitted the prosecution to introduce

5
ether checks of the series which had been withheld by
the prosecution from defendant into evidence and per:nitted persons whose identity had been withheld from
,lefendant and suppressed by the State to testify and to
:illegedly identify the defendant as the person who cashed
.ither checks of the series sought by defendant. (Ex 4 &
LJ 1 Defendant was unable to produce similar evidence
from other persons who had cashed similar checks from
,hat series because of suppression of the other checks
; mm that series by the prosecution.
POINT I
IT IS A DENIAL OF DUE PROCESS OF LAW TO
PERMIT THE PROSECUTION TO SUPPRESS EVIDENCE FAVORABLE TO THE DEFENDANT

Suppression by prosecution of evidence favorable to
defendant is a denial of due process, irrespective of the
good or bad faith of the prosecution, 21 AM. Jur 2d,
Criminal Law Sec. 225; 33 ALR2d 1421, and is a violation
of the rights secured by the fifth amendments Curtis v.
Rives, 75 Ap DC 66, 123 F2d 936 and of the fourteenth
amendment to the U.S. constitution. Mooney v. Holohan,
~94 US 103, 79 L.3d 79 L.ed. 791, 55 S Ct 340, 98 ALR 406,
reh den 294 US 732, 79 L. ed 1261 55 S Ct 511; Pyle v.
Kansas, Mooney v. Holohan (1935) 294 US 103, 79 L. ed.
791, 55 S Ct 340, 98 ALR 406, reh den 294 US 732, 79 L.
ed. 1261, 55 S Ct 511; Pyle v. Kansas (1942) 317 US 213,
87 L. ed. 214, 63 S Ct 177; White Thunder v. Hunter (1945
CA 10th Kan) 149 R3d 578, cert den 325 US 889, 89 L. ed.
2002, 65 S Ct 1579, 141 F2d 500; Pyle v. Amrine (1945)
195 Kan 458 156 P2d 509. cert den 328 US 749, 90 L. ed.

'
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448, 66 S Ct 45, reh den 326 US 809, 90 L. ed. 493, 66 S
Ct 165; U. S. ex rel. Montgomery v. Ragen (1949, DC Ill)
86 F. Supp 382; Woollomes v. Heinze (1952, CA 9th Cal)
198 F2d 577, cert den 344 US 929, 97 L. ed 715, 73 s Ct
499; Burns v. Lovett (1952) 91 App DC 208, 202 F2d 335
affd 346 US 137, 97 L. ed. 1508, 73 S Ct 1045; White v:
Ragen, 324 US 760, 764, 65 S Ct 978, 89 L. ed. 1348; Hysler
v. Florida, 315 US 411, 413, 316 US 642, 62 S Ct 688, 86 ,
L. ed. 932; Jones v. Kentucky, 6 Cir, 97 F2d 335, 333 ,
Soulia v. O'Brien, DC Mass, 94 F Supp 764. State courts
considering deliberate suppression of evidence favorable
to the accused have generally held that such conduct is a
denial of due process. Morhous v. Supreme Court of New
York (1944) 293 NY 131, 56 NE2d 79; People v. Whitman
( 1945) 185 Misc 459, 56 NYS2d 709, 177 P2d 918.
Suppression by prosecution after request by defense of
accomplice's confession violated the due process clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment where accomplice's confes·
sion admitted that he had actually strangled the victim.
Brady v. Maryland (1963) 373 US 83, 10 Led 2d 215; 83
S Ct 1194. Withholding of requested statement given to
police which contained admission by a prosecution wit·
ness which was favorable and vitually material to de·
fense was held to be a deniel of due process. US ex rel.
Butler v. Maroney (1963, CA3 Pa) 319 F2d 622. Sup·
pression of evidence, including a bullet, that tended to
show that the defendant did not fire the fatal shot where
evidence is material as to punishment is a denial of due
process. US ex rel Almeida v. Baldi (1952, CA3 Pa) 195
F2d 815, 33 ALR2d 1407, cert den 345 US 904, 97 Led
1341 > 73 S Ct 639 ) reh den 345 US 946, 97 L ed 1371, 73 S
Ct 828. Refusal after request to produce pair of mens
I

1
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shorts that did not belong to defendant, found in hotel
room in prosecution for killing of a woman in that room
held to be denial of due process where the evidence is
material either as to guilt or as to punishment. People v.
Hoffman ( 1965) 32 Ill 2d 96, 203 NE2d 873. See also Barbee v. Warden, Maryland Penitentiary (1964, CA4 Md)
331 F2d 842. Failure to reveal laboratory report favorable to accused held to be denial of the fairness required
under the due process clause of the constitution. People
'·"Whitmore, (1965) 45 Misc 2d 506, 257 NYS2d 787. The
court observed in State v. Cook (1965) 43 NJ 560, 206
A2d 350 in a case involving withholding of a medical
report of the state's psychiatrist that a prosecuting attorney must deal fairly and may not constitutionally
withhold material evidence which favors the defendant.
In People v. Preston (1958) 13 Misc 802, 176 NYS2d 542
involving withholding of hospital and autopsy reports
the court stated that any action or omission by the district attorney which prevents a defendant from presenting evidence which may establish his innocence may result in a denial of due process of law under the Fourteenth Amendment.
See also annotations at 33 ALR2d 1421 and 7 ALR3d 8,
32 and cases there annotated and discussed for extensive
discussion and digest of law. The law is clear that suppression of evidence favorable to the accused in a criminal trial is a denial of due process.
In this case the prosecution through the police department systematically gathered up the bank records, all of
the checks that had been cashed as a part of the alleged
scheme of which the checg which defendant purportedly
uttered was a part and withheld that evidence from de-
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fendant notwithstanding demands for a bill of particulars
prior to the preliminary hearing (R. 2 & 3). An appeal to
this court in an attempting to secure that information
prior to preliminary hearing, (Redmond v. Salt Lake City
Court, et al 17 U2d 95, 404 P2d 964), a demand for a bill
of particulars prior to trial (R. 2-3), extensive arguments
thereon (R. 597-620; R 606-618) and various motions, objections and requests for continuances (R. 358; R 401-403)
and for declaration of a mistrial (R. 358; R 401-403) failed
to produce said information required for defendant to
prepare his defense.
In a recent Utah case in the Federal District Court for
Utah it was held that the prosecution having caused the
doctor to testify in such a manner as to leave impression
that rape had been committed when he was of the opinion that sodomy but not rape had been committed on the
victim constituted a suppression of evidence in violation
of due process. The defendant was ordered released from
custody, subject to further action by the state. Turner v.
Ward, CAlO Utah 321F2d918.
POINT II
SUPPRESSION BY THE PROSECUTION OF THE
EVIDENCE SOUGHT BY THE DEFENDANT IS CONTRARY TO THE PUBLIC POLICY OF THE STATE OF
UTAH AS ANNOUNCED BY THE LEGISLATURE
The legislature of the State of Utah has declared that
the fair administration of justice requires that evidence
sought by any party in any legal proceeding shall not be
concealed by any person with intent to prevent its production at that legal proceeding and has made it a crime
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for any person to destroy or conceal any such evidence.
The question of admissability of such evidence is properly left to the Court who may accept or reject the preoffered evidence when it is offered at the legal proceeding. The intentional concealment of such evidence to
prevent its "production" at the proceeding is denounced
by law. 76-28-39, UCA, 1953 reads as follows:

"76-28-39. DESTROYING OR CONCEALING EVIDENCE. - Every person who, knowing that any book;
paper, instrumentin writing or other matter or thing
is about to be produced in evidence, upon any trial,
inquiry or investigation whatever authorized by law,
willfully destroys or conceals the same, with intent
thereby to prevent it from being produced is guilty of
a misdemeanor."
If Redmond had in some manner obtained possession
of exhibit P-4 or other evidence which the prosecution
wanted to produce at the trial of this matter, whether
that information were actually admitted by the court
when offered or not, we reasonably could have expected
that a complaint would have been issued against him
charging a violation of 76-28-39, UCA, 1953 (supra). The
statute creates no exception in favor of the prosecution
which would permit suppression or concealment of evidence by the prosecution of evidence which Redmond
tried diligently to obtain for presentation at his trial, but
which evidence was gathered up by the prosecution for
purposes of concealing it from Redmond. If the true intent of the statute is to be carried out Redmond is entitled to access to any available evidence which he wants
to produce in evidence at the trial, whether it is in the
possession of a third party or the prosecution. The right
to access to such evidence necessarily requires that it be
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made available to him in sufficient time to permit him
to investigate other evidence and testimony which may
become known to him from that evidence. In this case it
was necessary for Redmond to have access to the checks
so that he could determine the identity of the persons who
cashed the checks, interview those persons as possible
witnesses and submit the checks to a handwriting expert
to establish that the identity of the person who cashed
each such check and placed the endorsement thereon was
the same as the person who actually cashed the check
with which he is charged in this case.
POINT III
SUPPRESSION OF EVIDENCE BY PROSECUTION
DEPRIVED DEFENDANT OF A "FAIR TRIAL" GUARANTEED BY THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSES OF THE
UTAH AND FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONS

A defendant in a criminal case comes into court clothed
with the presumption of innocence (77-31-4, UCA, 1953)
and the state is required to prove his guilt beyond areasonable doubt or he is entitled to an acquittal (77-31-4,
UCA, 1953). Reasonable doubt may result from either the :
failure of the prosecution to produce sufficient proof or
from evidence adduced by the defendant which creates a
reasonable doubt as to his guilt. In a recent case this
court has stated that:
" ... the rights of one accused of crime are in no wise
to be belittled nor ignored. The fundamental purpose
of a criminal trial is not solely to convict the accused.
It is to seek the truth and administer justice ... " ,
State v. Faux, 9 U 2d 350, 345 P2d 186.
1
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In this case Redmond was denied the right to obtain
the names of witnesses who had cashed other checks of
the same series, approximate amount, drawn by the same
person to the same payee and cashed at about the same
time by the use of the same identification. He was also
denied to copies of those checks which had been gathered
up and suppressed by the prosecution. This denied him
access to that evidence which was vital to the preparation
and presentation of his defense by enabling him to identify the persons who cashed the other similar check of
the same who could be called as witnesses to establish
the fact that Redmond not the person who cashed the
checks. By a handwriting expert he could link the checks
together to establish that all of the checks of that series,
including the check charged in the information were
cashed and endorsed by the same person (R601). Certainly such evidence would at least tend to establish a
reasonable doubt in the minds of the jury as to his guilt.
The Court erroneously ruled that such evidence was
relevant but not material and refused to require the
prosecution to permit Redmond to inspect those checks,
yet permitted that very evidence to be introduced into
evidence at the trial by the prosecution.
Didn't this action deny Redmond the rights guaranteed
by 77-31-4, UCA, 1953 with respect to the burden of proof
beyond a reasonable doubt by refusing to permit him to
establish evidence which may well have established a
reasonable doubt in the minds of the jury. Wouldn't such
evidence have convinced the jury of Redmonds innocence
guaranteed by 77-31-4, UCA, 1953 when it denies a defendant the right to evidence favorable to the accused
which he has requested from the prosecution and thereby
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impliedly substitute a presumption of guilt by infering
that since the defendant is guilty anyway he cannot be
prejudiced by refusal of discovery since all his counsel
needs to do is to ask him what he did to prepare his defense.
POINT IV
THE COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN DENYING
DEFENDANT ACCESS TO CHECKS IN THE POSSESSION OF THE PROSECUTION TO PREPARE HIS
DEFENSE
The Utah Statute pertaining to the right of a defendant
to a bill of particulars (77-21-9), UCA, 1953) recognizes
the right of a defendant to limited discovery in criminal
cases by permitting the defendant to obtain additional:
"facts" which the court deems to be" . . . in the interest of justice ... "
That statute sets a standard for the Court in applying
the statute by stating:
"In determining whether such facts, and if so, what
facts, should be so furnished, the court shall consider
the whole record and the entire course of the proceedings against the defendant."
This court recognized that discovery in criminal cases
is properly the function of the court in State v. Faux pertaining to screening of transcript of grand jury hearing
(supra). This procedure recognized that problems may
exist in a particular case which might make it unwise to
grant certain discovery in unusual criminal cases and
leaves the question of whether unusual circumstances
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exist in a particular case which would justify denying
discovery to the sound discretion of the trial judge who
is close to the problems in a particular case. Utah is one
of the few states that has a workable procedure in the
statutes which will permit a workable realistic criminal
discovery by the defendant. This procedure has been conservatively applied and little used in Utah until the State
v. Faux case (supra).
In England and Canada criminal discovery is virtually
unlimited. No evidence is permitted at the trial that was
not presented at the preliminary hearing without notice
to the defendant. In 1792 pretrial inspection of documents
was sought by a high official of the East India Company
charged with malfeasance and corruption but was denied
with the outraged comment of the then Lord Chief Justice that to grant such a request would "subvert the
whole system of criminal law," however by 1883 Sir
James Stephen was able to say that this was barbarianism not to be tolerated in a decent criminal procedure.
See Discovery in Federal Criminal Cases, 33 F.R.D. 47
at page 59. The fears expressed by opponents of liberal
discovery in criminal cases appear unfounded when we
examine the results of the Canadian procedure and the
similarity between the conditions in Canada and the
United States. California has established extremely
liberal discovery good results and without the problems
forseen by opponents of liberal discovery procedure. Our
experience in liberal discovery procedure in civil cases is
a good illustration of the benefits derived and the effectiveness of judicial supervision of discovery to prevent
abuses. Criminal discovery need not be a one way street
as illustrated by the California ruling that neither the
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privilege against self-incrimination nor the attorney.
client privilege are violated if the defendant is required
to disclose in advance only what he himself intends to
disclose at the time of the trial. Jones v. Superior Court ,
58 Cal. 2d56, 22 Cal. Pptr 879, 372 P. 2d 919.
Opponents of liberal criminal discovery argue that his
is a one-way street with no benefits to the prosecution.
Does not the prosecution benefit from a sharpening of
the issues, exposure of untenable arguments, more efficient marshalling of evidence, disposing of more cases
without trial and from the important public interest in
the acquital of the innocent. Similar benefits have been
derived from statutes requiring notice to the prosecution
of alibi and insanity defenses, which in itself is a form is
discovery for the prosecution. Does not refusal of discovery eliminate the chance to prove the truth as well
as the false. The argument that the dishonest accused
may abuse rights of discovery by perjury, intimidation,
etc. when such an argument prevents also prevents the
honest accused from the opportunity to clear himself. In
a recent case this Court stated:
" ... all fair-minded persons will concede that ultimately the full truth should be revealed to the court
and jury. In such instance the truism should be recognized that the truth should have nothing to fear
from light." State v. Faux (supra)
Soviet prosecutors vigorously objected to adoption of
the prevailing American rules of discovery in the Nuemberg war crime trial on grounds that they are just "not
fair to defendants." The result was compromise procedure which permitted the accused at those trial more
liberal discovery than allowed under American Law, al-
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though apparently narrower than Soviet or French practice sanctions. 33 F.R.D. 47 at P. 59.
Discovery under prevailing criminal procedure in the
United States is a one-way street, with the state being
permitted to build its case against the accused in its
leisure without real concern for cost and with the aid
of governmental power, experts, science and implied
threats of holding a person as a material witness or of
charging him with one of the vague conspiracy, accessory, principal or other statutes if he does not cooperate
with the state in its discovery procedure. The large number of complaints of police abuses by interrogation, the
large number of guilty pleas or convictions resulting
from confessions induced by threat, promise, pressure,
interrogation, etc. indicate that the state exercises extensive discovery procedure even against the accused.
The presumption of innocence and burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt fall short of counterbalancing
the advantages of the prosecution in a criminal case.
In this case the law theoretically gave Redmond the
theoretical presumption of innocence and right to acquittal if a reasonable doubt as to proof of his guilt existed, however by withholding from him the evidence
necessary to present a defense which would establish his
innocence or a reasonable doubt makes this right:
" ... ineffectual and but an empty deluision, unworth
of our standards of fairness to both sides in such a
trial." State v. Faux, (supra).
If we deny him the right to discovery we are in essence saying that he has no cause to complain because he
knows what he did and does not need discovery anyway.
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Again the right becomes an "empty delusion" and "ineffectual," State v. Faux (supra). The Court recognized
that the evidence sought by Redmond was "Relevant"
(R. 616), ruled that this evidence would be inadmissable
at the trial and denied his right to obtain that evidence
which the prosecution was withholding, although the
Court allowed the prosecution to present a part of that
very evidence at the trial (Ex 4 & 9) over Redmonds objections. (R 597-603; R 356-359; 401-403).
POINT V
INFORMAL DISCOVERY AT DISCRETION OF PROSECUTOR NOW IN WIDE USE IS A DENIAL OF
EQUAL PROTECTION UNDER THE LAWS GUARANTEED BY THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT AND BY
ART. 1, SECTIONS 2 AND 24 UTAH CONSTITUTION.
The amount of information available in a criminal
case where this matter is left to the discretion of the
prosecution will vary according to (1) who the prosecutor is, (2) who the defense counsel is, (3) who the defendant is, ( 4) whether the prosecution believes that it
has a strong or weak case and ( 5) many other unknown
factors which may be present in a particular case. This
court has denounced as "dangerous" a procedure whereby the prosecution would "screen" evidence to be made
available to the defendant and has held that this function
is a judicial function to be performed by the Court.
State v. Faux (Supra). The right to discovery of evidence
in a criminal case should be afforded to everyone or to no
one. Our legislature has very wisely placed the discretion
in the trial judge to determine what information should

17
be open to discovery in a criminal case (77-21-9, UCA,
1953). The defendant believes that the Court abused
that discretion too narrow of a construction on that
statute in this case and that for this reason the defendant
should be granted a new trial with instruction to the
court to permit him to have access to the other checks
issued apparently as a part of the plan or scheme by the
persons who perpetrated the fraud as requested by defendant in his demand for a bill of particulars (R. 2-3).
POINT VI
THE COURT ERRED IN PERMITIING THE STATE
TO PRESENT IN EVIDENCE A CHECK OF "CAL J.
COON"
The information (R. 1) and the instructions of the
Court to the jury (R. 121, 129, 130) all refer to the fictitious person involved in the alleged offense as a "Carl
J. Coon", however the alleged fictitious instrument
charged in the information (Exhibit P.6) bears the signature of a "Cal J. Coon." The information was amended
to strike the name C. J. McCall and substitute therefor
the name Carl J. Coon after this defendant had been
arrained and before the trial, (R. 605) however the preliminary hearing was limited to consideration of a charge
of utter a check for the payment of money of C. J. McCall.
The posture of the case and the evidence is insufficient
as a matter of law to sustain a conviction of the defendant
for the following reasons:
(a) Defendant has not waived and has not been given
a preliminary hearing on the charges for which he was
convicted in violation of 77-23-3 (2) (a) and Art I, Sec.
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13, Constitution of Utah. The preliminary hearing was
limited to a charge of uttering a fictitious instrument for
the payment of money of C. J. McCall. He was convicted
of uttering a fictitious instrument for the payment of
money of Carl J. Coon. It may be that each of these alleged offenses would constitute a separate crime in
properly charged and proven, however the court lacks
jurisdiction to try the defendant and it is error to try
the defendant on a charge different from the charge
contained in the complaint at the preliminary hearing.
State v. Freeman, 93 U. 125, 71P.2d196; State v. Jensen,
103 U. 478, 136 P.2d 949; State v. Crank, 105 U. 332, 338,
142 P.2d 178, 180; State v. Nelson, 52 U. 617, 176 P. 860.
The limitation on the jurisdiction cf the Court to try
Redmond without holding or waiving a preliminary hearing is further illustrated by Art. VIII, Sec. 6 of the Utah
Constitution which reads in part as follows:
"The District Court shall have original jurisdiction in
all matters civil and criminal, not excepted in this
Constitution, ... "
Art. I, Sec. 13 reads in part as follows:
"Offenses heretofore required to be prosecuted by indiction, shall be prosecuted by information a~er ex-

amination and commitment by a magistrate, unless
the examination be waived by the accused with the
consent of the State ... "
The information to which Redmond entered a plea
charged him with uttering a check for the payment of
money of C. J. McCall. (R. 1, R. 596-597) It was not until
a later date when a co-defendant who is not involved in
this appeal was arrained that the information was
amended to charge the offense with which Redmond
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stands convicted. (R. 605) Since the amendment occurred after Redmond had entered his plea the provisions of 77-23-10, UCA, 1953 with respect to waiver of
his right to object to the failure to hold or waive a preliminary hearing concerning charges in the information
are not applicable to our situation. To the extent that
said statute purports to limit the right to preliminary
hearing guaranteed to the defendant by Art. I, Sec. 13
quoted above, that statute is unconstitutional and void.
A motion was made by defendant which was in legal

effect a motion for arrest of judgment after the verdict
of the jury was read and before the defendant was called
for imposition of judgment (R. 592 in accordance with
the provisions of 77-34-1, UCA, 1953, 77-23-10, UCA,
1953 also purports to effect a waiver of the right to a
preliminary hearing if the defendant shall fail to object
to the information on that ground prior to entry of his
plea to the information, however that statute is also inapplicable since Redmond had no cause to object to the
information at the time that he was arraigned and entered his plea to the information, however that statute
to the information at the time that he was arraigned and
entered his plea since the information charged the same
offense as had been charged in the complaint at the preliminary hearing. It appears that the cases which hold
that the defendant has waived irregularities with respect
to the preliminary hearing or lack thereof by not objecting prior to entry of his plea to the information are not
germaine to the issue herein involved because they are
based on the waiver provisions of 77-23-3 (2) (a) and
77-16-2, UCA, 1953 where defendant has entered plea to
information and those statutes simply do not apply to
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this defendant since he has never entered a plea or been
arraigned on an information wherein he was charged
with uttering a check for the payment of money of Carl
J. Coon. He entered a plea to an information charging
him with uttering such an instrument of C. J. McCall, a
separate and distinct offense. Accordingly the Court
lacked jurisdiction to try and pass judgment upon this
defendant by reason of those basic defects in procedure.
POINT VII
THE COURT ERRED IN ALLOWING THE STATE TO
CALL WITNESSES WHOSE NAMES HAD NOT BEEN
INDORSED ON THE INFORMATION AND WHO
WERE PREVIOUSLY UNKNOWN TO DEFENDANT
77-21-52. U.C.A., 1953 provides in part as follows:

"Where an information or indictment is filed, the
names of all the witnesses or deponents on whose
evidence the information or indictment was based
shall be indorsed thereon before it is presented, and
the prosecuting attorney shall endorse on the information or indictment at such time as the court may
by rule or otherwise prescribe the names of such
other witnesses as he proposes to call.*** No continuance shall be allowed because of the failure to
indorse any of the said names unless such application (to have the names indorsed) was made at the
earliest opportunity and then only if a continuance
is necessary in the interest of justice."
Section 77-17-4 requires that the names of those testifying at a preliminary hearing be indorsed on an information. These two statutes clearly evidence an intention
that defendant is not to be faced with a host of unknown
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witnesses at the time of trial whose character, background, reliability, etc., and testimony are totally or partially unknown to him. It is not the intent of the adversary system under present principles and practice
that a trial be conducted in an atmosphere of surprise,
chicanery and maneuvering. The code explicitly requires
that the names of witnesses be made available to defendant before trial. The purpose of indorsement of
names of witnesses is to advise the defendant who the
witnesses are. State v. Faux (supra). This right has been
held to be a substantial one People v. Lee, 12 N.W.2d 418,
307 Mich 743; People v. Smith, 241 N.W. 186, 257 Mich
319; People v. Tamosaitis, 221 N.W. 307, 244 Mich 258,
and the requirement should be faithfully observed by
the prosecuting attorney. People v. Tamosaitis, supra.
The defendant demanded the names of all witnesses
for the prosecution and Mr. Jay Banks, District Attorney,
expressly agreed to promptly furnish the names of any
witness other than the four indorsed on the information
which the state intended to call (R 607). No additional
names were ever furnished defendant not indorsed on the
information prior to the time of trial, yet fourteen additional witnesses were called by the state. These witnesses
should not have been allowed to testify, over defendants
objections or if it were shown by the state that they were
not known prior to the trial, then a continuance should
have been allowed in order for defendant to prepare to
meet their testimony as requested by defendant (R 358;
401-403) Many of these were the very people defendant
had sought to discover prior to trial, and which the state
had refused to disclose. Their testimony had previously
been ruled immaterial by the trial court. (R-615)
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In Cohn v. State (Okla. 1913), 135 P. 115, the state had
called a witness whose name had not been indorsed on the
information and who had not been discovered until after
the commencement of the trial. The court said at page
1156:
"It is clearly shown that the witness Van Tress was
not discovered until the noon recess of the court
after the case had been put on trial. The assistant
county attorney made a clear showing that he was
entitled to have the testimony of this witness. The
court did not err in permitting his name to be indorsed, and allowing him to testify. If counsel had
asked for a continuance for the purpose of securing
evidence to meet that of this witness, it would have
been the duty of the court to grant ii(;; but no such request was made. If the record disclosed facts which
indicated that the county attorney had acted unfair,
and was purposely holding back information relative
to the witness, then a reversal would be warranted

"

Defendant, in the instant case, has sought to learn the
names of witnesses having information bearing upon the
identity of the persons who accepted other checks of the
same series as the one of which defendant is accused.
These checks were gathered up from various merchants
by the police and were in the hands of the prosecution,
and not available to defendant from any other source.
The prosecution, has deliberately concealed these names
of witnesses to be called by the Prosecution from defendant, and has purposely failed to abide by their agreement to supply the names of additional witnesses, to indorse their names on the information or to appraise defendant of the state's intention to call them at trial. The
record clearly discloses facts which indicate that the
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prosecution acted unfair and purposely withheld information relative to the additional 14 witnesses who were
called to testify at the trial for the prosecution. Under
the holding of the Cohn case, supra, a reversal would be
warranted.
The advisability of reversal is even more clearly perceived when the purpose of the indorsement or furnishing of the names of prosecution witnesses is considered.
It has been stated that the purpose includes, among other
things, the following objectives:
(1) That accused may properly prepare for trial by
knowing something of history, antecedents, and character of witness who are to be produced. State v. King,
182 P.2d. 915, 66 Ariz. 42;

( 2) To guard accused against the production of persons
who are unknown and whose character he should have
an opportunity to canvass. People v. Quich, 25 N.W. 302,
58 Mich, 321;
(3) To appraise accused of his accusers and give the
defendant an opportunity before trial to interview such
witnesses and time to prepare to meet their testimony.
State v. Fedder, 285 P.2d. 802, 76 Idaho 535.
( 4) A witness should not be permitted to testify in
chief over objection of defendant, until his name is endorsed upon information, unless such endorsement is
waived. Evans v. State, 312 P. 2d 908 (Okl. Cr.)
(5) The purpose of the statute requiring the county
attorney to endorse upon the information at the time of
filing the names of witnesses for the state, if known is
to protect the defendant from surprise and unfair ad-
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vantage and to afford him a fair opportunity to adequately defend himself. State v. Cooper, 406 p.2d 691 (Mont.);
State v. Phillips, 264 P.2d 1009, 127 Mont. 381.
(6) The purpose of requiring the endorsement of
names upon indictment at time of presentment is to advise the defendant of persons who will give evidence in
the trial against him and grand jury witness, whose name
is not endorsed on indictment, may not testify over defendant's objection. State v. McDonald, 361 P. 2d 1001
(or.)
In the instant case, defendant was never given an opportunity to investigate the background, character history etc., of the 14 witnesses called unexpectedly by the
state. He was given no opportunity to prepare to meet
their testimony. There was no reason why these names
could not have been made available to defendant except
the desire to obtain every possible advantage for the
prosecution at the time of trial. The state has evidence
bad faith which bad faith would warrant a reversal
under the doctrine of the Cohn case, supra. The argument presented by the prosecution in opposition to defendant's motion for evidence which would have enabled
defendant to learn the names of many of these surprise
witnesses, was in essence an argument that since the
other checks of the series which these witnesses had
cashed were immaterial to the issues in the case the defendant had no need for that information, (R 597-602;
R 606-618). This argument persuaded the judge that evidence concerning the other checks and persons who accepted those other checks of the same series was immaterial (R. 620-621) since the prosecution did not intend to present evidence concerning said other checks as
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a direct result the defendant was refused access to those
other checks. (R. 597-602; R 606-618).
The unfairness to the defendant resulting from the
failure of the prosecution to furnish names of additional
witness which it had agreed to furnish to defendant, the
representations a motions prior to trial to the effect that
none of the other checks would be used in evidence at the
trial, the resulting denial to the defendant of evidence
necessary for him to defend himself against the surprise
witnesses and the refusal of the court to give the defendant any relief from this situation (R. 401-403) illustrate the fact that Redmond was in fact denied his
right to a "fair trial," was not afforded "due process of
law," and was unfairly surprised by the surprise witnesses produced by the prosecution. At the very least defendant was entitled to a continuance of the trial to give
him an opportunity to meet the surprise witnesses and
evidence, which the Court denied R 401-403; R. 358, notwithstanding the language contained in 77-21-52, UCA,
1953 (supra), and requires that a new trial be ordered.
POINT VIII

THE COURT ERRED IN PERMITTING THE STATE TO
INTRODUCE PROOF OF OTHER CRIMES AFTER
PRECIOUSLY RULING THAT SUCH EVIDENCE
WOULD BE IMMATERIAL AND INADMISSIBLE
The state, over defendant's vigorous objection (R 401403; R 358) was allowed to introduce evidence concerning several other checks of the same series for the purpose of establishing the defendant's identity as the person who allegedly cashed the check charged in the in-
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formation. After previously having ruled that such evidence would be immaterial and hence inadmissible, (R
620-621) and on that ground denying defendant an opportunity to secure such evidence then in the possession
of the state (R 597-602; R 606-618; R 401-403) it was
clearly error to allow the state at the time of trial, without any notice to defendant, to introduce such evidence.
This is just a matter of simple fairness, so obvious that
there is a veritable dearth of reported cases on this particular point. Counsel was able to find only three in the
whole reporter system.
In a New Jersey case, 1965, the defendant had entered
an insanity plea to a murder prosecution and then objected to examination by psychiatrists for the state. The
court held (Headnote 13):
"If a defendant is capable mentally of cooperating to
extend deemed necessary by doctors who are examining defendant on behalf of state for purposes of
forming an opinion as to defendant's sanity, and defendant fails or refuses to cooperate on motion of
state the defense psychiatric testimony shall be limited to same extent. "State v. Whitlow, 210 A.2d.
763."

In Commonwealth v. Hourigan, 89 Ky. 305, 12 S.W.
550 (1889) where the defendants testimony as to an alleged conversation with a certain person was excluded,
it was held proper to refuse to allow the other person to
testify thereto.
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POINT IX
THE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING OTHER CHECKS

OF THE SAME SERIES, DRAWN ON THE SAME

BANK ACCOUNT, PAYABLE TO THE SAME PAYEE,
AND CASHED AT ABOUT THE SAME TIME WITH
THE SAME IDENTIFICATION WERE INADMISSABLE.

In ruling on the admissability of the additional checks,
and evidence related thereto, which defendant had sought
to have produced for inspection and examination before
trial R 597-603; 608-620; 622 the court erroneously concluded that these checks, and the circumstances surrounding their negotiation was "relevant but not material" R 617. Defendant had sought to have these checks
produced for inspection before trial in order to establish
the true identity of the person cashing them through
means of handwriting experts to show that the same
person endorsed and cashed all checks of the series and
by means of testimony of the individuals who had accepted the said other checks whom defendant proposed
to produce as witnesses to testify that he did not cash
said checks (R 597-603; 608-620).
The state argued that the identity of persons cashing
other similar checks had absolutely no bearing on the
prosecution for uttering the particular check for which
defendant was charged. The court accepted this reasoning, stating that " ... it wouldn't matter whether or not
he was recognized as having uttered other instruments
bearing the same instrument (sic) or other persons had
uttered instruments which he had signed." (R 615) on
page 616 of the record, the court stated: "Whether or not
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in a given case a defendant has evidence to establish that
similar instruments, also fictitious were executed bv
someone other than himself wouldn't make any
ference," and later stated "I'd have to conclude that these
other checks would not be admissible under the charge
of uttering. I couldn't visualize how they might produce
these other checks so far as execution of them as such
evidence bearing upon defendant uttering this particular
instrument, and if that's correct, and I think it is, it's
maybe relevant but it's not material to the issue." (R 617)

dif-

Counsel for defendant then stated: "Your Honor, unless we have these checks or at least the names of the
ladies to whom they were issued, we can't even learn
the identity of the people who cashed them." The court
replied: "That would be of no consequence." (R 617)
The checks, and the testimony of the persons who had
accepted them, were clearly material, relevant to the issues, and should have been held admissable. In fact when
the state offered testimony concerning additional checks
at the time of trial, the court correctly held that they
were admissible. (R 131, 188, 191, 211, 238) As a general
rule, evidence of other similar crimes committed by the
defendant is admissable to prove the commission of the
offense charged. There are certain well grounded exceptions, however. Thus is People v. Harvey, (N.Y., 1923)
139 N.E. 268, 235 N.Y. 282, the court stated:
" . . . the people cannot prove the offense charged by
showing the commission of earlier or subsequent offenses. To this rule there are the exceptions which
have been many times given by the court and which
were stated in People v. Moliniux, supra. We said
'The exceptions to the rule cannot be stated with cat-
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egorical prec1s10n. Generally speaking, evidence of
other crimes is competent to prove the specific crime
charged when it tends to establish (1) Motive; (2)
intent; (3) the absence of mistake or accident; (4)
a common scheme or plan embracing the commission
of two or more crimes so related to each other that
proof of one tends to establish the others; (5) the
identity of the person charged with the commission
of the crime on trial 168 N.Y. 264, 293, 61 N.E. 286,
294 ( 62 L.R.A. 193)"
See also State v. Bock 39 N.W. 2d. 887 (Minn. 1949);
State v. Stuart, 203 Minn. 301, 281 N.W. 299; State v.
Lucken 129 Minn. 402, 152 N.W. 769; State v. Barrett 40
Minn. 65, 41 N.W. 459, State v. Sweeny 180 Minn. 450,
231 N.W. 225, 73 A.L.R. 380, and the annotations in 3
A.L.R. 1540; 22 A.L.R. 1540; 22 A.L.R. 1016; 27 A.L.R.
357; 63 A.L.R. 602.
The state, introduced additional checks in order to attempt to establish a common scheme or plan embracing
the commission of two or more crimes so related to each
other that proof of one tended to establish the proof of
the other, and to establish the identity of the defendant
as the person who cashed the check charged herein. This
was the very reason for which defendant had sought to
obtain the checks except that defendant would have used
them to negative the identification made by the state's
witnesses.
In State v. Bock, 39 N.W.2d. 887, twenty seven checks
and a check protector had been stolen from General Roofing Company. The next day a man presented one of the
stolen checks drawn on General's account in the amount
of $62.20 payable to Harold A. Camden. The cashier stated
that she would have to call the bank and confirm the
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check, the man excused himself left the store and failed
to return. The check was never indorsed. At the trial, over
the defendant's objection, three other checks were introduced and witnesses identified the defendant as having
passed them. The defendant's defense was alibi that he
was at home when the checks were passed. He attempted
to introduce two checks cashed on the same day as the
check for which he was charged, in the identical amount
and payable to the same payee. He sought to show by
the clerks who received the checks that the person who
presented them was not the defendant. The Minnesota
court said:

1

"Proof of similar acts constituting separate and distinct crimes is admissible under an exception to the
general rule, not for the purpose of showing specifically that defendant committed the crime with
which he has been charged, but for the purpose of
permitting the trier of facts to draw an inference
from the evidence showing a general plan or scheme
consisting of a series of acts similar to that with
which defendant is charged, that he did commit the
crime with which he is charged. 2 Witmore, Evidence, 3dED. Section 304. In determining defendant's
guilt, the identity of the person who presented exhibit A is the decisive factor. Inasmuch as an inference that defendant uttered exhibit A is pennissible from evidence showing that he passed exhibits
B, D, and F, there appears no good reason why an
opposite inference that defendant was not the person who offered exhibit A is not permissable from a
showing that checks identical with exhibit A were
offered or passed on the same day and in a like man·
ner by someone other than defendant. In discussing
this question, Wigmore, in his work on evidence 3d.
ed., Section 304 has this to say: 'It should be noted
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that this kind of evidence may be also available to
negative the accused's guilt. E.g. if A is charged with
forgery and denies it, and if B can be shown to have
done a series of similar forgeries connected by a plan,
this plan of B is some evidence that B and not A
committed the forgery charged. This mode of reasoning may become the most important when A alleges
that he is a victim of mistaken tdentification.' " Again
in Id. Section 341, p. 245 we find the following:
'Notice that here, as throughout this series of offenses, the principle of similar acts (ante section 304)
can be used to exonerate an innocent accused, where
the acts evidencmg the plan are those of a third person not the defendant. ' "
The court then quoted with approval Commonwealth
v. Murphy, 282 Mass 593, 185 N.E. 486. In that case the
defendant had sought to show that three other checks
identical in typing and handwriting with the four of
which he was accused were passed by someone other than
himself. The trial court had sustained the state's objection
to their admissability. The Massachusetts supreme court
said:

"No one, we think, will deny that if the evidence
offered is the truth it well might shake confidence in
the identifications upon which alone this conviction
rests.*** It indicates that two others who met the
man who writes and acts as the defendant is accused
of doing are ready to testify that he is not the defendant. It does not establish his innocence. The
handwriting on the seven checks may not all be that
of one man. Two thieves may have worked together
to protect one another by following the same plan
and acting and looking in the same way. It does not
follow that, because one did not do a thing on October 1, he did not do a similar thing in May and June.
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Acquittals in two courts do not establish freedom
from guilt on a different date in a different court.
Mistake in identification by one person does not
prove another one wrong. These are considerations
for a jury. But owing to the ruling (of the trial
court) no jury has passed upon them. Unless some
positive rule of law prevents, it would seem that the
defendant is entitled to have a jury consider the evidence, pass upon its credibility and wright it with the
evidence of ident~fication upon the issue of guilt."
In the State v. Bock case, supra, after quoting the above
from Commonwealth v. Murphey, the court specifically
concluded that the defendant:
" ... should also have the right to show that crimes
of a similar nature have been committed by some
other person when the acts of such other person are
so closely connected in point of time and method of
operation as to cast doubt upon the identification of
defendant as the person who committed the crime
charged against him. State v. Harris, 153 Iowa 592,
133 N.W. 1078."
It seems clear, without possibility of contradiction, that

the defendant was entitled to show that other similar
crimes, part of a scheme, plan or design, utilizing the
same series of checks, payable to the same payee, and
cashed at about the same time of the month had been
committed by another, and that the trial courts ruling
that such checks were inadmissable was clearly wrong.
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POINT X
THE STATE'S EVIDENCE THAT IT HAD SEARCHED
IN THIS AREA FOR THE ALLEGEDLY FICTITIOUS
PERSON WAS INSUFFICIENT TO ESTABLISH THAT
NO SUCH PERSON EXSTED
Defendant objected to the insufficiency of evidence
adduced and lack of foundation established to permit the
officer to testify that no such person could be located in
the vicinity of Salt Lake County, (R. 440) and to the
sufficiency of the jury instruction with respect to the
adequacy of the investigation (R. 589) and pointed out
that many persons commute to the Salt Lake County
area from Tooele, Summit County, Davis County, Weber
County and other areas since area of inquiry did not include those areas and it may well be that such a person
does in fact exist in those areas and it may well be that
such a person does in fact exist in those areas who commutes to the Salt Lake County area but would not be
located by a search limited to the Salt Lake County area.
The search made by said officer was limited to calling
some utilities companies in Salt Lake Valley, looking in
the telephone book and city directory and checking with
the office of the secretary of state. (R 440) Such a search
would be unlikely to reveal the existence of a person who
rented a furnished apartment which included utilities
and who had an unlisted telephone number or had no
telephone. Certainly it would have been reasonable for
such an investigation to have included a check of the
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police files, a check with the credit bureau and other
credit agencies, a check with the dairies and newspapers
and it would be reasonable to include surrounding areas
in that investigation.
If we accept such a superficial investigation to establish the existence of one of the basic elements of the
crime which must be proven by the prosecution beyond
a reasonable doubt are we not setting aside the presumption of innocence guaranteed by the constitution and substituting in lieu thereof a presumption of guilt.

No search was made with respect to a Cal J. Coon, although the check charged in the informati'On (Ex. P. 61
was signed by a Cal J. Coon. The investigation made by
the officer was limited to a search for a person named
Carl J. Coon. (R. 588) The prosecution must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the person who purportedly executed said check is a fictitious person before c.
criminal offense is proven. The record is completely void
of any investigation as to the non-existence of a Cal J.
Coon in the area and accordingly as a matter of law the
prosecution had failed to prove a vital link in their burden of proof as the conviction should be reversed.
CONCLUSION
The actions of the prosecution and the Court in withholding and permitting suppression of evidence favorable
to the accused, in calling 14 surprise witnesses when only
4 witnesses' names were endorsed on the information, in
agreeing in open court after demand by defendant for
names of witnesses to supply names of witnesses and
failing to do so, in leading the defendant, his counsel and
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the Court at a motion prior to trial to believe that no
checks other than the one charged in the information and
no witnesses concerning checks other than the one
charged in the information would be called to testify at
the trial as justification for refusal to make other checks
of said series and witnesses concerning those checks, all
of whom were unknown to defendant, and at the same
time preventing defendant from obtaining access to the
names of other similar witnesses who could rebut that
testimony, in admitting evidence by the prosecution that
the Court has previously ruled to be inadmissable by the
defendant as justification for withholding that evidence
from the defendant when demand therefor was made in
a pre-trial motion, and the inadequacy of the evidence
bv the prosecution to establish that the maker of the
d1eck charged in the information was in fact fictitious
clearly illustrate that the defendant was denied a "fair
trial." was denied "equal protection under the laws," was
denied " due process of law" and was unfairly convicted
of a crime which he did not commit. The verdict and
judgment should be reversed and set aside and the case
remanded for a new trial after a preliminary hearing on
the charge contained in the information and the prosecution should be ordered to make available to defendant the
other checks of the same series as the check with which
he is herein charged.
Respectfully submitted,
Ronald C. Barker
2870 South State Street
Salt Lake City, Utah
Attorney for Defendant-Appellant

